Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Portugal
Modal semantics for causal explanation
In causal explanations, an operator (explains, because) establishes a causal relation between 2 propositions: an explanans (ϕ) and an explanandum (ψ), denoting specific events:
a. The fact Jones had untreated syphilis explains why Jones had paresis. [ϕ explains ψ]
b. Jones had paresis because he had untreated syphilis. [ψ because ϕ]
My objective is to propose a denotation for this operator. I present key properties of causal explanations: namely, their presuppositional and contrastive properties, as well as their connection to causal ascription. I then reject a naïve causal account of causal explanations, according to which causal explanations are truth-conditionally equivalent to causal ascriptions. Finally, I argue for the view that causal explanations are causal statements embedded under modals, and in particular probability modals. Moreover, I argue that causal explanations carry additional presuppositional and assertive content that reflects their contrastive features.